Altruistic Behavior and Correlated Equilibrium Selection

This paper studies new refinement concepts for correlated equilibria based on altruistic behavior of the players and which generalize some refinement concepts introduced by the authors in previous papers for Nash equilibria. Effectiveness of the concepts, relations with the corresponding notions for Nash equilibria and with other correlated equilibrium refinements are investigated. The analysis of the topological properties of the set of solutions concludes the paper.correlated equilibrium, altruistic behavior, refinement

On Multicriteria Games with Uncountable Sets of Equilibria

The famous Harsanyi's (1973) Theorem states that generically a finite game has an odd number of Nash equilibria in mixed strategies. In this paper, we show that for finite multicriteria games (games with vector-valued payoffs) this kind of result does not hold. In particular, we show, by examples, that it is possible to find balls in the space of games such that every game in this set has uncountably many equilibria so that uncountable sets of equilibria are not nongeneric in multicriteria games. Moreover, we point out that, surprisingly, all the equilibria of the games cor- responding to the center of these balls are essential, that is, they are stable with respect to every possible perturbation on the data of the game. However, if we consider the scalarization stable equilibrium concept (introduced in De Marco and Morgan (2007) and which is based on the scalarization technique for multicriteria games), then we show that it provides an effective selection device for the equilibria of the games corresponding to the centers of the balls. This means that the scalarization stable equilibrium concept can provide a sharper selection device with respect to the other classical refinement concepts in multicriteria games.

Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution Equilibria

Multicriteria games describe strategic interactions in which players, having more than one criterion to take into account, don't have an a-priori opinion on the rel- ative importance of all these criteria. Roemer (2005) introduces an organizational interpretation of the concept of equilibrium: each player can be viewed as running a bargaining game among criteria. In this paper, we analyze the bargaining problem within each player by considering the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution. We provide existence results for the so called Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution equilibria for a general class of disagreement points which properly includes the one considered in Roemer (2005). Moreover we look at the refinement power of this equilibrium concept and show that it is an effective selection device even when combined with classical refinement concepts based on stability with respect to perturbations such as the the extension to multicriteria games of the Selten's (1975) trembling hand perfect equilibrium concept.

Slightly Altruistic Equilibria in Normal Form Games

We introduce a refinement concept for Nash equilibria (slightly altruistic equilibrium) defined by a limit process and which captures the idea of reciprocal altruism as presented in Binmore (2003). Existence is guaranteed for every finite game and for a large class of games with a continuum of strategies. Results and examples emphasize the (lack of) connections with classical refinement concepts. Finally, it is shown that under a pseudo-monotonicity assumption on a particular operator associated to the game it is possible, by selecting slightly altruistic equilibria, to eliminate those equilibria in which a player can switch to a strategy that is better for the others without leaving the set of equilibria.

A Limit Theorem for Equilibria under Ambiguous Beliefs Correspondences

Previous literature shows that, in many different models, limits of equilibria of perturbed games are equilibria of the unperturbed game when the sequence of perturbed games converges to the unperturbed one in an appropriate sense. The question whether such limit property extends to the equilibrium notions in ambiguous games is not yet clear as it seems; in fact, previous literature shows that the extension fails in simple examples. The contribution in this paper is to show that the limit property holds for equilibria under ambiguous beliefs correspondences (presented by the authors in a previous paper). Key for our result is the sequential convergence assumption imposed on the sequence of beliefs correspondences. Counterexamples show why this assumption cannot be removed.Ambiguous games, beliefs correspondences, limit equilibria

Social Networks: Equilibrium Selection and Friendliness

Given their importance in determining the outcome of many economic interactions, different models have been proposed to determine how social networks form and which structures are stable. In Bala and Goyal (2000), the one-sided link formation model has been considered, which is based on a noncooperative game of network formation. They found out that the empty networks, the wheel in the one-way flow of benefits case and the center sponsored star in the two-way flow case play a fundamental role, since they are strict Nash equilibria of the corresponding games for certain classes of payoff functions. In this paper, firstly we prove that all these network structures are in weakly dominated strategies whenever there are no strict Nash equilibria. Then, we exhibit a more accurate selection device between these network architectures by considering ‘altruistic behavior’ refinements. Such refinements, that we investigate here in the framework of finite strategy sets games, have been introduced by the authors in previous papers.

LTLf and LDLf Monitoring: A Technical Report

Runtime monitoring is one of the central tasks to provide operational decision support to running business processes, and check on-the-fly whether they comply with constraints and rules. We study runtime monitoring of properties expressed in LTL on finite traces (LTLf) and in its extension LDLf. LDLf is a powerful logic that captures all monadic second order logic on finite traces, which is obtained by combining regular expressions and LTLf, adopting the syntax of propositional dynamic logic (PDL). Interestingly, in spite of its greater expressivity, LDLf has exactly the same computational complexity of LTLf. We show that LDLf is able to capture, in the logic itself, not only the constraints to be monitored, but also the de-facto standard RV-LTL monitors. This makes it possible to declaratively capture monitoring metaconstraints, and check them by relying on usual logical services instead of ad-hoc algorithms. This, in turn, enables to flexibly monitor constraints depending on the monitoring state of other constraints, e.g., "compensation" constraints that are only checked when others are detected to be violated. In addition, we devise a direct translation of LDLf formulas into nondeterministic automata, avoiding to detour to Buechi automata or alternating automata, and we use it to implement a monitoring plug-in for the PROM suite

Specification and Verification of Commitment-Regulated Data-Aware Multiagent Systems

In this paper we investigate multi agent systems whose agent interaction is based on social commitments that evolve over time, in presence of (possibly incomplete) data. In particular, we are interested in modeling and verifying how data maintained by the agents impact on the dynamics of such systems, and on the evolution of their commitments. This requires to lift the commitment-related conditions studied in the literature, which are typically based on propositional logics, to a first-order setting. To this purpose, we propose a rich framework for modeling data-aware commitment-based multiagent systems. In this framework, we study verification of rich temporal properties, establishing its decidability under the condition of “state-boundedness”, i.e., data items come from an infinite domain but, at every time point, each agent can store only a bounded number of them

Transient growth in the flow past a three-dimensional smooth roughness element

This work provides a global optimization analysis, looking for perturbations inducing the largest energy growth at a finite time in a boundary-layer flow in the presence of smooth three-dimensional roughness elements. Amplification mechanisms are described which can bypass the asymptotical growth of Tollmien–Schlichting waves. Smooth axisymmetric roughness elements of different height have been studied, at different Reynolds numbers. The results show that even very small roughness elements, inducing only a weak deformation of the base flow, can localize the optimal disturbance characterizing the Blasius boundary-layer flow. Moreover, for large enough bump heights and Reynolds numbers, a strong amplification mechanism has been recovered, inducing an increase of several orders of magnitude of the energy gain with respect to the Blasius case. In particular, the highest value of the energy gain is obtained for an initial varicose perturbation, differently to what found for a streaky parallel flow. Optimal varicose perturbations grow very rapidly by transporting the strong wall-normal shear of the base flow, which is localized in the wake of the bump. Such optimal disturbances are found to lead to transition for initial energies and amplitudes considerably smaller than sinuous optimal ones, inducing hairpin vortices downstream of the roughness element